THE RIGHT TO ZEALOUS COUNSEL
PAUL D.

CARRINGTON*

Providing legal counsel for persons in trouble and in need is both a
practice of ancient lineage1 and a dynamic contemporary movement.
This public purpose results from the adversary tradition and our democratic concern for the plight of weaker citizens. It is a consummate
expression of our shared concern for individuals, a concern that no individual's rights go unheeded through the misconduct of important legal ceremonies.
For a very long time the movement to make legal services available to those in need has been preoccupied with the form of legal representation rather than its substance. We have striven to assure the
presence of professional counsel, with little concern for the quality of

the service ultimately provided. In the last decade or so, there has been
increased awareness that making a lawyer available is not enough. The
effectiveness of counsel has become an issue of growing importance.
This emphasis on the effectiveness of counsel is certainly appropriate; few doubt that poor representation can be worse than none at all.

Most of the discussion to date, however, has been concerned with technical competence of counsel. 2 While technical competence may be a
* Dean of the School of Law and Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1952, University of Texas; LL.B. 1955, Harvard University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research
assistance of Joyce S. Rutledge, member of the Duke University School of Law class of 1981.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE; Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations therein hereinafter cited only by DR and EC numbers];
R. HERMAN, E. SINGLE, & J. BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR (1977) [hereinafter cited as
COUNSEL FOR THE POOR];
E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM (1974) [hereinafter cited as E. JOHNSON].
1. The history of legal services to the poor has four phases. The first phase has been described as "political" and is represented by the patron-paeon exchange in the relationship around
the Roman "clientela." The second phase has been described as "charitable"--the medieval
mode, for instance. The nineteenth century recognized a "political right" to counsel, while the
twentieth century has made access to counsel a "legal right." See Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategiesforan Ethical Legaliy, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1974).
2. A host of empirical reports is given in COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 9-10. Typical of such
studies is the assessment of criminal attorneys in the cities of Denver and San Diego by Jean
Taylor and associates. Taylor, Stanley, deFlorio, & Seekamp, An Analysis o/Defense Counselin
the Processingof Felony De/endantsin Denver, Colorado, 50 DEN. L.J. 9 (1973); Taylor, Stanley,
deFlorio, & Seekamp, An Analysis ofDefense Counselin the ProcessingofFelony Defendantsin San
Diego, California,49 DEN. L.J. 233 (1972).
Case law on effectiveness of counsel is abundant and has been surveyed in a number of
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problem, it is not the subject of this Article; the concern here is with the
spirit of advocacy.
Spirited advocacy is important at two levels. While we do not
know to what extent advocacy does truly influence outcomes of disputes, it seems not unlikely that the degree of influence is in part a
product of the degree of effort expended by the advocate. If our purpose in assuring counsel is to protect rights, it is important that counsel
strive to achieve that result.
Moreover, legal proceedings are important in their ceremonial effects. It is an important purpose of a proceeding to reinforce feelings of
trust, not only in those who must accept the decisions but also in the
public that must accept the institutions. The role of advocate is, in important measure, to build trust in the fairness of the system. To inspire
trust, the advocate must not only be vigorous, but he must also seem so.
Thus, we are as concerned with the appearance of zeal as with its reality. We want and need counsel who strive for, and who seem to care
3
about, their clients.
I.

THE SOURCES OF ZEAL

Zeal does not appear to be in short supply for lawyers being paid
directly by their own clients. Although there have always been episodic
complaints, particularly about criminal defense work performed in urban courts, clients who select and compensate their lawyers generally
retain enough control to assure that matters are handled satisfactorily.
At least this has been true for those clients who are part of the return
trade, or who are likely to share their reactions with other prospective
clients. As long as the lawyer is in business, he is usually in business to
please the clientele, and that endeavor requires perpetual effort.
Our experience with contingent fees demonstrates the relation between zeal and the incentive system. The contingent fee was the chief
nineteenth century contribution to the movement to make legal services
available to weak litigants. It was a Jacksonian departure 4 from the
more traditional rule that forbade lawyers from acquiring interests in
litigation, a corollary of the ancient English constraint on barratry.
The argument for the contingent fee was, and is, that it makes counsel
articles. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973);
Finer, Ineective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973); Grano, The Right to
Counsel, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representationas a
Ground/or Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964).
3. See CODE Canon 7.
4. Radin, Contingent Fees in California,28 CAL. L. REv. 587, 588 (1940).
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available to those who cannot afford to pay 5-and so it does.
A secondary attraction of the contingent fee has been its apparent
provision of an incentive for zeal. As the author of the leading work on
contingent fees reports: "[T]here is much in the current use and discussion of contingent fees which indicates that the basic premises from
which its proponents argue are rooted in the economic beliefs of a
profit-motivated, commercially oriented society .... -6 Even the
wealthiest litigants have been permitted to use contingent fees for
claims in which such practice is allowed, such as personal injury or
eminent domain.7 Experience suggests that most clients prefer to exercise the contingent fee option when given the choice, in part to assure
zeal.
It has now become clear, however, that the customary contingent
fee does not always work to provide the intended incentive. 8 As Professors Schwartz and Mitchell revealed a decade ago, this economic incentive rewards fast, cheap settlements.9 A lawyer who can settle a case
with no time invested in it can go on to the next case quickly and better
enrich himself, while one who labors through a full proceeding may
obtain much more for his client, but only a little more for himself. Indeed, he may well earn less than he would receive from the additional
cases that he would otherwise be able to handle. Feeble advocacy in
the negotiation of sizeable claims is, therefore, a familiar canker in the
practice of law. Douglas Rosenthal has more recently chronicled this
inadequacy, focusing on the tendency of personal injury lawyers to coerce settlements from their own clients.' 0 It is uncertain whether appropriate measures can be taken to correct this feature of contemporary
contingent fee practice. It is clear, however, that although personal injury practitioners are economically motivated men and women, zealous
advocacy is not always rewarded, and when zeal is not rewarded, it is
often absent.
There are, of course, notable examples of lawyers providing legal
services of the highest quality without remuneration. Usually these examples have been efforts on behalf of what the Code of Professional
5. EC 2-20.
6. F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 15 (1964).
7. Id. 70. MacKinnon also enumerates other common areas of contingent fee practice. Id.
25-28.
8. Three areas of potential conflict of interest are described in H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF
COURT 82-83 (1970).

9. Schwartz & Mitchell, 4n Economic Analysis of the ContingentFee in Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970).
10. D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT. WHO's IN CHARGE? 98-99, 109-12 (1974).

1294

DUKE L4W JOURNX[

[Vol. 1979:1291

Responsibility calls "unpopular clients and causes."" The representation of unpopular cases was first recognized as a professional obligation
in the late eighteenth century. The duty had the distinct flavor of noblesse oblige. Such early exponents of the obligation as Lord Erskine
and Josiah Quincy seemed to have given premier efforts on behalf of
unpopular clients without pay.' 2 So it has been for many lawyers in
this century, such as those who defended alleged communists in the
early fifties, 13 or who engaged in many other ventures led by the American Civil Liberties Union.' 4 These representations, however, often
provide compensation in the form of nonmonetary rewards such as
favorable recognition, at least by a small audience if not by the public
at large. It seems fair to assert that zeal has rarely been purely the
product of an unalloyed sense of professional obligation.
Such a conclusion need not lead to cynicism or despair. To invert
Anatole France's cynical question about whether lawyers were ever
children, the answer is affirmative: lawyers are people, too. The behavior of most people-lawyers and others-is, over time, largely the
product of external influences. Exhortations, such as those in the Canons of Ethics, are important, but the effect of exhortations is lost if
they urge a course of conduct that is seldom if ever rewarded in some
way. Everyone needs reinforcement. While there will be admirable
exceptions of lawyers laboring to do what few will ever know or care
about, a system that desires zealous advocacy on the whole will have to
reward it.
Moreover, even if it were not true that lawyers are people in the
respect just stated, the serious problem that they often appear to be
people would remain. As long as the clientele attributes normal human
motives to lawyers, it will be hard to convince a client that his lawyer is
exerting effort when the lawyer is not visibly productive. Unfortunately, a fundamental characteristic of an advocate's services is that
one can seldom visually associate his effort with favorable consequences. Few clients are prone to credit counsel for good results.
Many clients are prone to be critical of lawyer performance even when
well served, especially if there is a gulf of culture or class between lawyer and client. For these reasons, client trust comes hard.
11. EC 2-27.
12. E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 13-38 (1963).
13, Id. 17-18.
14. Private activist groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Legal Defense
Fund (formerly associated with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-

ple), who were responsible for the "first wave" of public interest law in the twentieth century, also
show a high selectivity in their orientation toward "big-impact" cases. See Rabin, Lawyers/or
Social Change. Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 209-24 (1976).
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THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT OF FEES

Maintaining zeal and the appearance of zeal has taken on a new
dimension for lawyers whose fees or salaries are paid by persons other
than their clients. Third-party payment is becoming a very common
practice. It is not novel: there were paid attorneys serving the poor in
the Roman Papal government and in the admired cortez of Toledo in
the fifteenth century.' 5 What is new about the American staff attorney
system is the scale of the enterprise.
Private lawyers established the Legal Aid Society in the nineteenth
century as an institutional response to the needs of indigents. 16 Like
other private charities of that time, it relied on volunteer help and provided rewards in the form of recognition for moral worth. In the early
twentieth century, a few paid professionals appeared in the ranks of the
societies and by World War I there were a number of full-time professionals.1 7 After the war, Reginald Heber Smith published his important work, Justice and the Poor,18 and the movement to improve the
availability of legal services received a powerful boost.
In 1932, the right to counsel achieved constitutional status.' 9 The
scope of the right has been steadily expanded ° so that it now applies
wherever substantial penalties are to be imposed on citizens. 2' The
number of cases to which the right applies has long since exceeded our
limited capacity for voluntarism. The size of the criminal bar is now
enormous, and most of its income is derived from representing persons
who are not able to pay for the services they receive. What we have is a
"bureaucratization of the defense of the indigent, '22 a "highly organized and systematized activity involving thousands of lawyers and
millions of clients."'2 3 Whether working independently by court appointment or as staff attorneys in the offices of public or private defenders, the attorneys enjoy neither high status nor high earnings. Their
15. A brief historical and comparative treatment is found in M. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER 9-14 (1919).
16. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8 (1951).
17. M. GOLDMAN, supra note 15, at 82-83, 87-98, acknowledges this growth. Salaried public
defenders were appointed in a number of cities and counties, and many state legislatures have

considered proposals for similar appointments.
18. R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919).

19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
20. A thorough survey of the early development is presented in W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955).
21. The right is pronounced "fundamental" in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963), and is broadened to include misdemeanants in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972).
22. COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 3.
23. Id.
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work is performed in isolation from any pressure to deliver satisfaction
to their clients. Like other providers of important public services, such
as social workers and educators, criminal defense counsel generally
hold a position of power over their clients.
A similar development has occurred on the civil side. While there
has been little recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in civil
matters, there has been a movement toward providing legal representation in civil cases. Congress has enacted legislation designed to provide
minimal legal services to indigents engaged in civil or administrative
disputes. 24 This was an important feature of the War on Poverty, a
centerpiece in the effort to achieve distributive justice in the 1960S.25
During the Nixon years, the movement was re-directed and substan26
tially enlarged under the auspices of the Legal Services Corporation.
The Corporation now supports programs throughout the United States.
In conjunction with state, local, and private agencies, it provides services to a very high percentage of the poor population of this country. It
employs thousands of attorneys, whose incomes are somewhat lower
than those of their criminal defense brethren and whose status is the
lowest of any group of the bar.27 Except for a few who are subject to
direct selection through an available Judicare plan, 28 these attorneys
are seldom accountable to their clients for the quality of the service
they deliver, and most of them function with enormous caseloads.
Another group of attorneys who receive their compensation from
third parties is presently emerging. Prepaid legal insurance has been a
vision of the organized bar for several decades, ever since it became
24. See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 215, 80 Stat.

1451 (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2996 (West Supp. 1979)).
25. E. JOHNSON 39-43, 137-140.
26. The Johnson era of great "wars" evoked a conservative backlash during the Nixon administration that included opposition to the reform strategies of the Office of Economic Opportu-

nity. Many details of this resistance appear in the congressional debates preceding the
establishment of the Legal Services Corporation as a replacement for the older Office of Economic
Opportunity. Vice President Agnew summarized the conservative point of view. See Agnew,

!hat'r Wrong With the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930 (1972). The goals of the more
radical reformers are sympathetically depicted in Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services
Crisis, 59 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1971).

The Nixon move is styled the "war against justice" in J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUsTIcE 299
(1976). The nature and quality of the service provided by the federal program are critically evaluated in Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems. The LegalAid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 106 (1977).

27. This was the finding with regard to members of the Chicago bar. Laumann & Heinz,
Specialization and Prestigein the LegalProfession, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 155,

167.
28. The best single overview of the Judicare model is provided in S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE
(1974). Brakel also points to research showing a strong client preference for Judicare over "welfare-type" legal services.
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apparent that Blue Cross-Blue Shield brought extraordinary prosperity
to the medical profession. The concept received a powerful boost in
29
1976 with the enactment of section 120 of the Internal Revenue Code.
That section grants experimental tax-exempt status for a period of five
years for payments made on behalf of employees for prepaid legal services. While this change has not brought the enormous increase in the
use of legal services that some had hoped,30 a substantial development
might still occur. Most of the prepaid plans employ the services of attorneys in private practice who are selected by their prepaid clients.
Some, however, including the largest, 3' provide legal services through
staff attorneys employed by the insuring group. These staff attorneys
are employed under circumstances similar to public defenders and legal services attorneys.
III.

THE EFFECTS OF THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT ON THE APPARENT
LOYALTY OF COUNSEL

Competing influences upon advocates make it difficult to maintain
the appearance and the reality of zeal. All attorneys have competing
obligations to court, self, and client. The sometimes conflicting nature
of these obligations can seldom be understood, much less appreciated,
by the clientele.
The exhortation to zeal that is expressed in the Code of Professional Responsibility is balanced by an exhortation to maintain "independent judgment." 32 The desire to preserve this independent
judgment lies behind the proscriptions of conflicts of interest and serves
as the unifying purpose behind the constraints forbidding lawyers to be
witnesses, 33 to be representatives of multiple interests, 34 or to acquire
29. The new section was enacted as § 2134(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, 90 Stat. 1926. Attempts to repeal section 120 have been rebuffed. See 3 NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CONSUMERS OF LEGAL SERVICES, NEW DIRECTIONS ACTION LINE

29

(1978).
30. Using a mail survey, G. Alpander and J. Kobritz recently conducted sketchy empirical
research into the popularity of prepaid legal services as an employee benefit. Their poll of 350
national corporations and 100 national unions, of which 150 corporations and 86 unions responded, is summarized in 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 172, 173-74 (1978). Only four percent of
the unions surveyed had put prepaid legal services on the collective bargaining table; of these, 70%
had been successful in securing prepaid legal services as a fringe benefit. Id. Legal services were
shown to be a less popular item than dental insurance. Id. The actual number of group prepaid
legal plans reported to the Department of Labor for 1979 was 3,500. Fretz, Decent Legal Carefor
Moderate Income Americans: Hopefor the Eighties, 36 NLADA BRIEFCASE 2, 2 (1979).
31. The UAW plan, inaugurated in 1978, is the largest with 140,000 members. ABA's Seventh
National Conference on PrepaidLegal Services, 47 U.S.L.W. 2293, 2296 (Nov. 7, 1978).
32. CODE Canons 5, 7.
33. DR 5-101(B).
34. DR 5-105.
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self-interests in litigation. 35 Detachment and zeal are uncomfortable
companions, however, and few lawyers have perfected the self-discipline to maintain both at all times. The obligations of zeal and independence thus may compete with one another; in excess, they may join
in mutual defeat. Lawyers frequently associate the idea of independence with personal autonomy and even the right or obligation to dominate clients.3 6 Some observers have noted a tendency toward
authoritarianism on the part of lawyers; 37 Rosenthal has gathered substantial data to show that lawyers impose their tastes and preferences
38
on their clients.
To some extent, many lawyers view such domination as a mark of
professionalism. Few lawyers emphasize the importance of helping clients make their own decisions on the basis of full information. Indeed,
one official bar publication states that reasoning "not only prolongs the
interview, but generally confuses the client. The client will feel better
and more secure if told in simple straightforward language what to do
and how to do it. . .. ,,39 While some have decried this attitude, it is
probably the norm for attorney-client relations in many areas of practice.
Against this background, it is scarcely surprising to find members
of the criminal defense bar, or the legal services bar, demeaning the
importance of their clients' judgment. It must certainly be the case that
lawyers who overbear their clients will be even more likely to do so if
the client has no control and no choice. Third-party provision of legal
services is therefore likely to provide masters as well as servers.
Not only does third-party payment tend to liberate the attorney
from the client's control, but it also helps to create a relationship of
rivalry. He who pays the piper may, or may seem to, call the tune. If
he does not call the whole tune, he may nevertheless be regarded as the
primary audience to be pleased by the piper. Thus, there is a special
danger that public defenders will not be trusted because they are perceived to be yet another arm of the state, in league with prosecutors.4"
35. DR 5-103.
36. Becker, The Nature ofa Profession, in EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS 38-39 (N.
Henry ed. 1962).
37. H. FREEMAN, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 236 (1964); W. WEYRAUCH, THE
PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS (1964).
38. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 10, at 29-61, 66-67, 112-16.
39. Id. 19.

40. Social and political scientists who have conducted personal interviews with criminal defendants often record their "distrust and hatred" of the public defender's office and the absence of

"handholding." The defenders' "inattention to psychological needs" is said to have "alienated"
the clientele. Indigents may be frustrated at being forced to use public services: they view the
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In legal services programs, the perceived third-party interest is
often political. In the early years of the federal program, political agencies often interfered directly in particular lawyer-client relationships to
pursue or frustrate particular claims or defenses deemed to have political importance. 4 1 One of the purposes for organizing the Legal Services Corporation in 1974 was to insulate the lawyer-client relationship
from external interference. This was done in return for modest constraints on litigation to pursue political ends.42 Nevertheless, one of the
goals of legal services programs continues to be the achievement of
general law reforms favoring the interests of disadvantaged citizens.
While the interest of the individual, disadvantaged client may often
coincide with the interests of the larger clientele, this is not always the
case, and the tension between the two is a legitimate source of mistrust
for the individual client.
The dimensions of this problem are enlarged by the difficulty in
maintaining a clear institutional purpose for legal services programs.
Inevitably, judgments must be left to individual staff attorneys who
may wish to enlarge their own importance by overblowing a case. Examples of this situation arise frequently. Perhaps the most sweeping
accusations have been made by Harry Brill, who has charged his former colleagues in the San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance
Foundation with massive manipulation of clients--even to the extent
of lying-to encourage elegant class suits in lieu of individual actions
that likely would have been more effective for the individuals involved. 43 While Jerome Carlin has disputed some of Brill's allegations, 44 he does not really deny that the Foundation lawyers had an
agenda of their own making, one which took precedence over the
desires and interests of individual clients. As Brill put it:
The specific needs of clients and the question of whether or not they
could gain from class action were incidental to the lawyers. They
were concerned only with filing as many dramatic class action cases
as possible. Among other things, this meant that they were constantly seeking out interesting issues and organizations that might
help generate them. So they had little time or patience for community4 5organizations that sought other, less dramatic kinds of legal service.

Another variety of conflict of interest that arises in the legal servpublic attorney as simply part of the system oppressing them. See P. WICE, CRIMINAL LAWYERS
202 (1978). See also J. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS' PERSPECTIVE (1978).
41. See E. JOHNSON.
42. Id. 39-43.
43. BrilI, The Uses andAbuses of Legal Assistance, 31 PUB. INTEREST 38 (1973).
44. Carlin, The Poverty Lawyers, 33 PUB. INTEREST 128 (1973).
45. See Brill, supra note 43, at 54.
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ices context is the practice of targeting particular defendants that legal
services programs identify as malefactors. Jeanne Kettleson describes
this activity as "focusing" to increase the impact of a program on particularly exploitative practices. 46 While this practice may be highly desirable from the viewpoint of the larger clientele, it can be contrary to
the interests of individual clients whose claims are not aimed at the
right target.
The problem of third-party interest extends as well to prepaid insurance plans for middle income clients. Since the programs are so
new, there is not yet much evidence that employers or unions will marshal the energies of their staff attorneys toward particular objectives.
The potential for abuse may be present in some plans, however, and
the staff attorneys are in some circumstances vulnerable to suspicion
that they may have substantial agendas of their own. Stuart Israel has
described the practice of targeting by one plan office in Columbus,
Ohio, which clearly illustrates the potential for serious abuse in some
prepaid plans.4 7 Thus, generally, clients are right to have less trust in
attorneys paid by third parties. Such attorneys seem more likely to
compromise their client's interests for the sake of their own goals.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE OF MISTRUST

The preceding statement is intuitive, but the perception is validated by the available empirical evidence, which tends to show that the
level of client mistrust is associated with the degree to which an incentive system gives the client some balance of power in the attorney-client
relationship. The most significant body of data on this subject has been
gathered by Herman, Single, and Boston in their recent work, Counsel
for the Poor.4 8 Based upon data from prosecutions in Los Angeles,
New York, and Washington, D.C., their work was limited to criminal
defense representation. Defense representation consisted of privately
retained counsel, appointed counsel compensated by the state, and
public defenders. The authors were unable to detect any significant
correlation in the resolution of cases that could be attributed to the
differences in delivery systems, although there was a barely discernible
over indifference in outcome that favored institutional staff attorneys
49
appointed.
or
retained
privately
were
who
lawyers
dividual
There was, however, a substantial difference in client perceptions.
46. Kettleson, Client Getting, 35 NLADA BRIEFCASE 12, 12 (1977).
47. Israel, Changing the Balance of Litigating Power, 2 NEw DIRECTIONS
102 (1977).
48. COUNSEL FOR THE POOR.
49. Id. 153, 160-61.

LEGAL SERVICES
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The authors found a "pervasive antipathy of unexpected magnitude toward publicly paid defense lawyers, primarily those who work for the
...
50 "[I]t rapidly became evident that
first-line defender systems.
these antipathies were based on defendants' suspicions about both the
loyalties and the abilities of these lawyers." 51 Many of the defendants
were, of course, experienced in the ways of criminal courts and had
data of their own on which to base their mistrust. On the other hand,
their powers of observation were offset by their inabilities to control
variables as could the data analysts. Evidently, the belief that public
defenders are ineffective was based on "general social assumptions...
[that] you get what you pay for."' 52 Illustratively, one defendant, when
asked if his Legal Aid lawyers did good work, replied, "No. Why
should they?" 53 Clients also believed that those on the public payroll
would retain a primary loyalty to the state court, not to the client.
Not surprisingly, the clients' disdain of lawyers was reciprocated.
Few defense lawyers thought their clients' opinions about the quality of
legal representation mattered. Their view was that criminal defendants
are "too self-interested, too anti-social, and too uneducated to have
opinions worth soliciting."'54 This reciprocation is, of course, a part of
the problem of creating a relationship of trust. The authors are surely
correct in expressing a view contrary to that of most defense lawyers:
Defendants' views of how effective their lawyers are and how
well their lawyers treat them are an important index of the extent to
which the criminal process in practice honors some of its most fundamental guarantees. And for the defendants themselves, a belief that
they are inadequately represented can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If they are not candid with their attorneys, or refuse to accept
legal advice, or are so uncooperative that they impair the attorneys'
motivation to work effectively for them, the end result may be the
same as if the state had failed from the start to provide adequate
representation.
The appearance of justice may also be crucially important to
what is presumably the central goal of the criminal process, which is
securing future compliance with the law both by the courts' immediate "clientele" and by other citizens. If the law's processes are perceived as unjust or arbitrary, they are unlikely to command the
respect of present or potential violators; if they are seen as capricious,
irrational, and unpredictable, their deterrent effect may also be un50. Id. 153.
51. Id.
52. Id. 156.
53. Id. 169.
54. Id. 167. Legal Aid lawyer distrust of defendant perceptions is evidenced in Erdmann, An
.4nswer by a Lawyer, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 57-62 (M. Hermann & M. Haft eds.

1973).
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dermined. 5
The available analysis of client perception of staff attorneys on the
civil side is less comprehensive. In part, this is because our experience
with alternative delivery systems in civil matters has been much more
limited than in criminal matters: the bureaucracy of the War on Poverty strenuously resisted the development of Judicare-the use of pri56
vate attorneys compensated at public expense to serve the poor.
Despite this resistance, however, some legal service plans do exist, and
there have been several efforts to compare client reactions to services
by private counsel with their reactions to comparable services by staff
attorneys.
The first, and still the most illuminating, study is that of Samuel
Brakel. His work on the Wisconsin Judicare experiment revealed a
"pronounced" client preference for private attorneys selected by the client.5 7 A second study made by Greenberger and Cole in Meriden,
Connecticut, produced results that were inconclusive about client perceptions, but clearly showed that social workers preferred to send their
welfare clients to staff attorneys and that the social workers found the
58
staff attorneys generally more congenial than private lawyers.
Earl Johnson, the leading spokesman for the staff attorney system,
has attacked the Brakel study, contending that Brakel's book is
methodologically flawed. 59 Brakel's rebuttal seems quite convincing 60
and is enhanced by Johnson's own final argument against Judicare,
which is that client choice is meaningless because of the pervasive client ignorance of the qualifications of lawyers. 6' As Brakel points out,
"[tlhis entire picture of poor people as a totally isolated and alienated
class of virtual subhumans is only one of several myths that are used to
support indiscriminate preference for social engineering, law reforming, and other paternalistic activities. '62 It is, in any case, a posture that bears a close resemblance to the views of defense counsel that
client appraisals of their work do not matter.
While one can hardly view this body of empirical data as dispositive, it does seem to confirm the intuitive thesis that assigning advo55.

COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 167.

56. See E. JOHNSON 117-21.
57. S. BRAKEL, supra note 28, at 127.
58. H. GREENBERGER & G. COLE, FINAL REPORT: CONNECTICUT STATE WELFARE DEPARTMENT LEGAL SERVICES DEMONSTRATION (1972).
59, M. CAPPELLETTI, J. GORDLEY, & E. JOHNSON, JR., TOWARDS EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 167-70 (1975).
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cates' roles to lawyers who are seen as having no stake in their clients'
welfare tends to reduce the level of trust associated with their lawyerclient relationships. It also tends to confirm that present levels of trust
are none too high.
Judicial observations provide further confirmation of this thesis.
Increasingly, courts are acknowledging that the assistance of counsel
provided in satisfaction of constitutional guarantees cannot be presumed to be effective. Although it remains unusual for a conviction to
be set aside on grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel, it is not unusual
for courts to acknowledge a substantial responsibility for oversight of
appointed counsel. Perhaps the strongest example of this requirement
is the opinion of the Supreme Court in Anders v. California,63 which
held that an appellate court cannot accept at face value the assertion of
assigned counsel that there is no ground for appeal. The Court further
held that it is the prescribed duty of the appellate court to search the
record for error and to prod counsel to be an advocate. This decision
was an expression of substantial mistrust of staff attorneys. If the
Supreme Court does not trust the lawyers, it is not surprising that the
clients do not either.
V.

REMEDIES TO ASSURE ZEAL

As the previous discussion notes, our present systems do attempt to

assure attorney zeal through various forms of supervision, even to the
extent of involving judges in the supervisory enterprise. Supervision is
currently the primary means used to assure the appropriate level of
effort by attorneys who are not financially accountable to their clients.
For reasons previously discussed, however, supervision is at best a
weak assurance of spirited advocacy. The supervisor of staff attorneys

faces the familiar problem that the quality of legal services cannot be
judged by the attorneys' tangible results. Supervisors can check to see
that formal steps have been taken, but this kind of inquiry only infrequently penetrates to the substance of the service rendered. Rarely, if
ever, does it extend to the matter of client satisfaction and the appearance of effective advocacy.
Moreover, supervision in high-volume law offices is itself a problem. Such offices face a constant tension between the quality and the
quantity of services to be rendered. When staff attorney time and energy are scarce resources, short-cuts in selected cases may be fully justified by the need to apply more time to the more important matters.
Gary Bellow has forcefully argued for the maintenance of consistently
63. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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high standards of performance in legal services offices, 64 but his argument seems insensitive to the competing interests of clients who must
be turned away if the staff attorneys invest too much effort in too few
matters. Thus a perpetual time problem arises in almost every matter
that is handled, and it is virtually unavoidable to leave substantial discretion with the individual staff attorneys in deciding how best to apply
their own time. Accordingly, too rigorous an application of checklist
supervision may at times be counterproductive to the purposes of the
legal services programs. While this aspect of the problem may be alleviated as the workload is reduced by fuller staffing, it is unlikely that a
public defender office or a legal services office will ever have sufficient
personnel to make careful decisions about individual time allocations.
Furthermore, it will always be true that the attorney who is accountable
to the client for his fee has a greater inducement to make effective use
of his time than does the individual staff attorney.
Supervision also gives little assurance to skeptical clients who are
suspicious of the motives of staff lawyers since the supervisor is just
another staff lawyer whose motives must be viewed in the same suspect
light. Supervisors will inherit no more trust than their supervisees enjoyed; they must earn it, perhaps by being accountable in some ways
that the staff attorneys are not.
Finally, it should be observed that there is very little opportunity
for supervising court-appointed criminal defense counsel. A few judges
do make an effort to control the quality of criminal defense advocacy
by maintaining a system of evaluation through which ineffective counsel may be removed from the list of those eligible for appointment. On
the civil side, there is no reported effort to impose supervision of any
kind on Judicare lawyers.
In addition to this nominal supervision, the present system does
afford other disincentives for lawyer neglect of the affairs of nonpaying
clients. For criminal defense lawyers, there is the unpleasant prospect
of embarrassment associated with a determination that one's representation of a client was so ineffective as to be unconstitutional. This possibility is so remote, however, that it is unlikely to arise often in the
minds of advocates or clients. Perhaps a more effective disincentive at
the present time is the developing law of professional malpractice. 65 It
is still the case, however, that few advocates are likely to be exposed to
liability by perfunctory and uninterested performances. For liability to
ensue, the neglect must be identifiable as a technical lapse, and a rather
64. Bellow, supra note 26, at 119-22.
65. A current description is R. MALLEN & V. LEViF, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1977).
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substantial one at that. Mere oversight of an "esoteric" rule appears
66
insufficient to expose counsel to suit.
In the final analysis, the only practice presently in use that is capable of generating positive incentives to the lawyers of nonpaying clients
is Judicare. Although Judicare lawyers are subject to little or no official
supervision, they are subject to the incentives of the marketplace. If
clients are to return or send their friends, the Judicare lawyer must give
satisfaction. The Brakel data tend to suggest that this method works, at
least to some degree.
One question that this Article seeks to raise is whether there are
variations on the Judicare model that can and should be more generally employed to make lawyers more accountable to nonpaying clients.
Herman, Single, and Boston have offered a suggestion, although
they limit their advocacy to the criminal setting in which they have
worked. They propose that every accused person should have the right
to fire the first lawyer assigned to his defense. 67 As they explain:
[I]mportant in equalizing the power of choice is the power to fire the
attorney, whether or not he or she was selected by the defendant in
the first place. Defender organizations and assigned-counsel systems
do not permit this; instead, they generally require that the court, on
the motion of the defendant or the lawyer or both, be asked to determine the issue. (In New York, a defendant who asks to be relieved of
a Legal Aid Society lawyer cannot get another Legal Aid lawyer.)
When faced with a request for a change of counsel that emanates
from the defendant and does not have his or her lawyer's endorsement, the court generally considers it the tactic of a chronic malcontent and routinely denies it. No doubt some defendants would be
encouraged to try to dismiss counsel without reasonable cause, perhaps to delay the proceedings against them. Nonetheless, the possible abuse of a right argues for safeguards, not wholesale denial of the
right. One safeguard might be for a defendant to be able to dismiss
his or her lawyer peremptorily (without cause and without court approval, but perhaps not on the eve of trial) only once in a case. The
defendant would retain the additional right to have any lawyer dismissed by the court for adequate justification.
Granting the indigent client this degree of control-which in
practical terms is still considerably less than that of the client of retained counsel-would do a great deal to encourage lawyer accountability, much as it does with retained counsel. It is not pleasant to be
fired, and it is bad for one's career. The power to fire their assigned
counsel might also stimulate a more demanding attitude and greater
66. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (en banc); c.
Smith v. Lewis, 13 CaM.3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (en banc) (attorney who
failed to assert client's community interest in retirement benefits in a divorce proceeding found

guilty of malpractice).
67. COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 173.
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frankness from clients who would otherwise be afraid of alienating
the assigned lawyer. In turn, this development could lead to
favorable consequences for the client, both in case outcome and in
satisfaction.
Allowing defendants to hire and fire their own appointed lawyers would unavoidably make any system of assignment of counsel
less cost-efficient. How much additional money it would take is impossible to estimate without some very crude guessing about how
many people would exercise their powers of choice. We doubt, however, that the cost would be very large, and it might be made up for
in benefits besides client satisfaction. Some cases, for example, might
be disposed of more quickly if the clients trusted their lawyers' advice; some posttrial proceedings challenging convictions by attacking
68
the competence of assigned counsel might never be brought.
Against the advantages must be weighed some substantial drawbacks. As the authors acknowledge, it is not unlikely that the power to
fire counsel could be used for dilatory purposes. Further, its effect on
the plea bargaining process is, at best, difficult to appraise in the absence of recorded experience. Nevertheless, it might be worth a try, as
a means to assure greater zeal. This idea may indeed be meritorious
enough to be considered for use in legal services programs as well as in
the administration of closed panel systems for prepaid services.
It would be worthwhile to consider other provisions to accompany
such a system of peremptory dismissals. A bonus system could reward
staff attorneys who give such satisfaction that they are seldom dismissed by their disgruntled clients. To carry this notion a step further,
a bonus system might also undertake to reward staff attorneys or appointed counsel for the favorable results they achieve. A significant
bonus for the public defender who secures an acquittal or a reversal
might serve as a substantial inspiration to zeal in many cases in which
it is presently lacking. It would at least afford some assurance to the
accused that he and his attorney share some community of interest.
At least two considerations arise in connection with this last suggestion. One is that the bonus system must not be so handsome that the
staff attorneys concentrate all efforts on cases in which they are most
likely to win. This problem of proportions is somewhat similar to the
problem of properly proportioning the usual contingent fee. Clermont
and Currivan's very excellent article 69 demonstrates that rigorous
thinking about the contingent fee can develop rules that fit the interests
of the client and advocate much more closely than does the present
customary practice. They propose a contingent fee that is in part mea68. Id. 173-74.

69. Note, Improving on the ContingentFee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529 (1978).
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sured by the attorney time invested in the case. If the winning advocate
is fully compensated for his time, with a smaller, flat percentage fee
added, then he will have an incentive to keep working on a case for as
long as necessary to achieve the best results for the client, but no longer
than is necessary. 70 It would seem that the logic of the Clermont-Currivan analysis might be applied to the problem of the staff attorney
bonus to produce a system that is at least intuitively sound. On the
other hand, it must be acknowledged that the effects on plea bargaining
in criminal cases might prove to be highly undesireable if a proper
balance could not be achieved.
The second consideration is the legitimacy of any contingent fee
interest in a criminal case. The Code of Professional Responsibility
twice proscribes contingent fees for criminal defense counsel, 7 1 but no-

where in the literature is the rationale for this emphatic rule clearly
stated. Perhaps the concern is that the bar's public relations would suffer too greatly if the great hired defense guns were seen to profit directly from frustrating law enforcement in publicized cases. In fact, it
is hard to see why the successful arguments for contingent fees in personal injury cases are not even more persuasive for criminal defense
cases. Whatever the unwritten concerns, it must surely be true that
they are directed primarily at the retained private criminal bar. There
is really very little occasion for concern, for all the reasons stated here,
that appointed counsel or public defenders could be rendered excessively zealous by the prospect of bonuses for acquittals and reversals.
That evil, should it even arise, can be dealt with at the time. DR 2106(C), which proscribes criminal defense contingent fees, should be
deemed inapplicable to bonuses paid to lawyers on public payrolls
whose incentives are so much in doubt.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Granted, there may be no fully satisfactory solutions to the problem posed. Certainly it seems unlikely that the problem would be
solved simply by greater use of Judicare or the variations just suggested, limited and dubious as they are.
The absence of good visible solutions, however, does not detract

from the seriousness of an under-appreciated problem. If lawyers for
nonpaying clients cannot be induced through a system of incentives to
represent their clients zealously, the right to counsel may become a useless cosmetic that insults more than it serves the interests of the cen70. Id. 578-80.
71. See EC 2-20; DR 2-106(C).
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tele. The reputation of the bar is a matter of interest to the community
as a whole, for it is unlikely that the public's regard for the law itself
can long survive disdain for the craftsmanship of those who administer
it. Further attention to these issues is therefore in order.

